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Technology-Based Design and Sustainable Economic Growth 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to analyze how design creates economic value. The literature on knowledge-
based economic development has primarily focused on innovation as the analytical lens, whereas 
design is the original action that leads to innovation. Despite the fundamental importance of 
design, existing design research has offered few insights and little guidance for national 
strategies due to the lack of focus on and analysis of design in an economic context. This paper 
addresses such gaps by linking design research and economic development theory. We first 
elaborate on the relationship among design, invention and innovation, describing the necessity of 
design activity for invention and innovation. Our analysis of the fundamental characteristics of 
design across contexts sheds light on the strategic importance of the accumulative nature of 
technology-based design for sustaining economic growth. Through the lens of technology-based 
design, we further quantitatively compare Singapore and three similarly-sized countries (South 
Korea, Finland and Taiwan). Based upon interview data, we also qualitatively examine 
Singapore’s national strategy focusing on design. The quantitative and qualitative results align 
well with the Singaporean government’s use of design as a strategic lever to pursue innovation-
driven economic growth, and also reveal its achievements and shortfalls which indicate possible 
directions for strategic adjustment. 
 
Keywords: Technology-based design; invention; innovation; design capability; economic 
growth. 
  
Research Highlights 
 
• This study links design research and economic development theory, and offers insights for 
national strategy for economic growth. 
 
• The paper first identifies that the accumulative nature of technology-based design is 
strategically important for sustaining economic growth.  
 
• The paper evaluates potential metrics for assessing technology-based national design 
capability, and applies the currently feasible ones to comparing four similarly-sized countries. 
 
• The paper assesses Singapore’s national design strategy for economic growth through the 
lens of technology-based design. 
 
 
 
  
1. Innovation, Invention, and Design 
Innovation is the critical driver of economic growth (Schumpeter, 1934; Solow, 1956), especially 
in advanced economies which have approached the frontier of knowledge and thus face limited 
opportunities to adapt exogenous technologies for production (Porter, 1990). Because of its clear 
importance, there have been numerous studies of how regions and nations can foster innovation 
through managing such factors as R&D manpower and spending (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998; 
Griliches, 1998), industrial environment and competitive dynamics (Rosenberg, 1963; Porter, 
1990), government policy and institutional environment (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Freeman, 
1995), etc. In particular, the growing body of research on design has added greatly to our 
knowledge of the innovation process (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Dym et al., 2005; Weisberg, 
2006).  
 
However, despite their relevance and importance, the findings and theories from design research 
have been overlooked in innovation policy and economic development studies (Hobday et al, 
2012). This paper supplements the preceding economic development studies on innovation alone 
by addressing design as the specific activity which results in innovation. In doing so, we build 
upon prior work which treats design as the process through which innovations emerge (Aubert, 
1985; Walsh, 1996), and focus on technology-based design for its specific advantage over other 
types of design in sustaining economic growth. To our best knowledge, we are the first to link 
design research and economic development theory. In so doing, the work leads to new insights 
for national strategies for an innovation-driven economy. 
 
Innovation, as defined by Schumpeter (1934), is “new combinations”, and also–in the language 
of economics–“the setting up of a new production function.” Schumpeter’s concept of innovation 
includes technical, marketing and organizational activities. According to Solow (1957), 
technology-based innovation accounts for more than 80% of long term economic growth and has 
been the emphasis of most studies on “innovation”. Technology innovation refers to the 
introduction of a new product, improvement in quality, and a new method of production, etc. 
(Hagedoorn, 1996). Innovation comes after invention and is invention that has successfully 
diffused in use, achieving real economic and social impact. 
 
Both invention and innovation emerge through a design process. Design is defined herein as a 
human process that uses knowledge to produce novel objects that are appreciated by or are 
useful to other humans. Inventions are creatively designed by humans with new mechanisms 
and/or new functions. The most recognizable inventions historically, such as the steam turbine, 
the electric generator, the light bulb, the car and the computer, were all “designed” and are thus 
“design output”. However, not all design efforts will necessarily result in invention, as some 
efforts result in less novelty than judged necessary for the label of invention. In a similar sense, 
not all inventions (despite their useful novelty) have sufficient benefits or are communicated in a 
way to result in adequate efforts to achieve diffusion and thus become an innovation. The 
relationship between innovation, invention and design output is shown in Fig. 1. Design 
activities create the possibilities for invention and innovation, but do not guarantee them. The 
design output may be inventions or not, and in turn inventions may become innovations or not.  
 
 
Fig.1. Relationship between Design Output, Invention, and Innovation 
 
However, innovation scholars on occasion overlook the design process, largely because the 
design process is difficult-to-anticipate and even difficult to recognize objectively. In contrast, 
the term “design” is used more often than “innovation” and “invention” by technologically-based 
practitioners, simply because design is the specific action which humans pursuing innovation 
actually perform. Thus, when one thinks about enhancing innovation, promoting design activities 
is more actionable than the narrative focus of innovation. In turn, design capability enables 
continual delivery of new products, services, and solutions, so is important as a strategic asset for 
a firm, region or nation to build up in order to compete in a knowledge-based global economy. 
Mastering it will give firms or regions sustainable competitive advantage (more detailed 
explanations are in section 2.3). Therefore, focusing on promoting design activities and building 
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up national design capability as explicit national strategies allows one to be more specific about 
what can be done for innovation. 
 
When considering “design”, many studies combine various kinds of design in questionable ways; 
for example combining engineering design with industrial or aesthetic design (Candi and 
Saemundsson, 2008) and sometimes combining what “CAD (Computer Aided Design) 
technicians” do with engineering design (Walsh, 1996). This ambiguity has limited the potential 
for effective actions to be taken. Following a survey and synthesis of the broader deign research 
literature in Section 2, we link design to an economic context as is necessary for innovation, and 
doing so allows “technology-based design” to appear fundamentally most valuable for driving 
and sustaining economic growth. We use “technology-based design” instead of an equivalent 
term “engineering design” (Dym et al, 2005) in order to explicitly emphasize the intensive use of 
scientific and technological knowledge and techniques in such processes. 
 
On that basis, we further use “technology-based design” as the analytical lens to examine 
national attempts to move towards an innovation-driven economy. We particularly examine 
Singapore, assisted with a comparison with Taiwan, Korea and Finland. All four of these 
countries have been heavily involved in moving into higher value-added activities and thus 
improving their design capability. The emphasis on Singapore arises because it is the only 
country, to our best knowledge, whose national strategy has explicitly emphasized the promotion 
of “design”-related activities for sustaining the nation’s economic growth. We conducted on-site 
semi-structured interviews at a number of organizations that participate in design-related 
initiatives in Singapore, in spring 2011, and report the interview results in this paper. 
 
Our analysis at the national level has important similarities to national innovation studies 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson,1993; Freeman, 1995), which emphasize the active roles played by 
specific institutions (companies, universities, government agencies, intermediary organizations, 
etc) and government policies, and their interaction in nurturing innovations in specific countries 
(See Dosi, 1988 and Nelson, 1993 for comprehensive reviews of the perspectives in the national 
innovation system literature). In this paper, we also examine the incentives and behaviors of 
different kinds of institutions and their interactions in a national system. In addition to that, we 
believe that emphasizing knowledge development in technology-based design in the examination 
supplements what national innovation system studies have been able to conclude. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews design research broadly and then design in 
an economic context which narrows the emphasis to technology-based design. Section 3 
discusses potential metrics to assess national design capability. Section 4 uses such metrics to 
compare Singapore and three other three countries quantitatively, and Section 5 further examines 
Singapore’s national design strategy using interview data. The final section concludes and 
discusses directions for future research. 
 
2. Fundamentals of design: survey and synthesis  
In much academic literature and common language, design is diversely defined. This can hinder 
the effective use of “design” as a lens to develop strategies and action plans for economic growth. 
There is a body of knowledge that is commonly referred to as “Design Research” or “Design 
Theory” (a branch of which can be labeled “engineering design research”) where some care in 
definitions has evolved (Simon, 1969; Dym, 1994; Walsh, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2006; 
Purao et al, 2008; Hatchuel and Weil, 2009; Hobday et al, 2012) and where extensive research 
has been done. This section attempts to review this literature in order to identify the strategic 
focus for design-based strategy for actions and policies relative to moving to the knowledge or 
innovation economy. 
 
2.1 Design process 
 
In the existing literature, the term “design” has been used as either a verb (i.e. activity/process) 
or noun. When used as a noun, the term “design” often means the output of a design process. 
Baldwin and Clark (2006) defined design as “the instructions based on knowledge that turn 
resources into things that people use and value”. Treating design as a noun has led to important 
understandings on product architecture (Eppinger and Ulrich, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000), 
organizational structure (Ulrich, 1995; Sosa et al, 2004), industry structure (Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Tushman and Murmann, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 
2000), and the functional performances of technologies as output of design (Moore, 2006; 
Martino, 1970; Nordhaus, 2007; Koh and Magee, 2006, 2008). While useful, such studies are 
naturally limited in explaining how design output arises, i.e. the process through which 
knowledge is turned in to valuable artifacts. 
 
A separate and much more extensive set of research findings results from looking at “design” as 
a human process, rather than its outcome. In a paper that most acknowledge was formative to the 
field of design research (Simon, 1969), a fairly simple but broad definition treating design as a 
verb was given--“design is the transformation of existing conditions into preferred ones.” To 
design is to transform existing knowledge and conditions into an artifact that meets certain 
human needs either directly or indirectly, either functionally or aesthetically. Moreover, the 
intensity of design activities as opposed to other economic and cultural activities may signal the 
extent to which a knowledge economy has been developed.  
 
As stated in the introduction section where we gave our elaboration of Simon’s definition, the 
present paper will focus on design as a process in order to understand more concretely what is 
done to create novel and valuable artifacts. Indeed, there have been increasing numbers of 
scientific studies on the design process (for intermediate summaries, see Antonsson and Cagan, 
2001; Dym et al, 2005). Such studies have illuminated some commonalities of design processes 
(which include the characteristics of the people who successfully design) across varied contexts, 
while acknowledging that understanding of the design process is still incomplete (Magee and 
Frey, 2006; Brooks, 2010). 
 
Numerous kinds of design activities are conducted by humans working in different domains to 
fulfill different needs and desires. As examples, engineers design products (software, materials 
or hardware) and services, engineers and other stakeholders design large-scale socio-technical 
systems, architects and others design buildings, managers design organizations and processes, 
government leaders design policies and regulations, and artists design poems, musical 
compositions, sculptures, etc. These specific design processes are vastly different, but all embed 
some characteristics in common at an abstract level, spanning designs of any form, scale, and 
scope, simply because they all follow a process to achieve appreciated novelty (Simon, 1969; 
Walsh, 1996; Purao et al, 2008). In contrast, our use of the term “design” excludes such activities 
as the development of embodiments such as prototypes or drawings because they lack the 
necessary novelty/creativity in their processes, whereas they are often also called “design”. 
 
In addition to the broad range of practice domains, interest in design research, generally 
conceived, has been shared by many scholars from different fields, such as cognitive 
psychologists, economists, engineers, architects, and others. Some of this work is focused on 
invention (or more generally creativity) but can with little effort be translated into the design 
framework we are using. Thus, we first seek to highlight the fundamentals of the design process 
that are common across contexts. 
 
2.2.Fundamentals of design, broadly considered 
 
Since design creates the world that has not existed previously, it is always creative (to a certain 
degree), regardless of domain. Creativity is important for design successes and arises through a 
system of interrelated forces operating at multiple levels, such as individuals, organizations and 
culture (Hennessey and Amabile, 2010). Creativity distinguishes design from production or 
service delivery processes where repetition is an essential element. While production requires 
factors such as labor and capital, a factor that design further requires is knowledge of various 
kinds, including scientific principles, understanding the latest realizations in various domains, 
and expertise in actual design practices.  
 
A consistent theme of much research in the area has emphasized the importance of deep 
expertise as the key enabler of successful creative design. Many case studies have verified the 
need for expertise across all fields including artistic and scientific novelty (for an excellent 
summary see Weisberg, 2006). The “10 year experience rule” (de Groot, 1965; Chase and Simon, 
1973; Chi et al, 1981; Ericsson, 1999), for individuals to continually build up necessary 
knowledge and experience so as to be able to achieve useful novelty, applies across diverse fields. 
 
Knowledge and the ability to use knowledge to derive novelty are the two essential linked 
elements of design expertise. A successful designer has deep knowledge and extensive 
experience in his or her domain of practice. This domain knowledge includes substantial 
appreciation of past design activities and design output, as well as detailed understanding of the 
latest developments, techniques and theories concerning designs in the domain (Weisberg, 2006). 
Of some importance is that the experience and knowledge must be kept “fresh” as infrequent 
experience can lead to forgetting what was learned previously and so result in little knowledge 
accumulation (Argote, 1999).  
 
Knowledge of the design process is also held by leading practitioners with this knowledge being 
viewed as highly non-structured (Brooks, 2010). The design process is a set of activities that 
begin with abstraction and end with useful novelty. Such activities include conception, problem 
definition, prototyping, generation and evaluation of alternatives, experimentation, and refining 
but overly structured organization of these activities has been shown by empirical and theoretical 
research to lead to less success than more flexibly structured processes (Frey et al, 2009). The 
importance of iteration between divergent and convergent thinking (Dym et al, 2005) and 
succeeding through failure (Petroski, 2006) has been emphasized and are embedded in a flexibly 
structured design process. 
 
The most fundamental cognitive sub-process used in design is analogical transfer (Weisberg, 
2006; Wood et al, 2009), elements of which have also been identified as “Generative Metaphors” 
(Schon, 1983). Analogical transfer involves the way designers explore the new or unknown 
using known exemplars and principles. Designers use analogical transfer during various design 
activities such as conception, evaluation, problem definition, etc. Given that analogical transfer 
means that new artifacts are developed by extension of existing knowledge, the known 
importance of deep knowledge of the field (more possible starting points) in successful design is 
well aligned with analogical transfer as the key sub-process used in design. 
 
Recent research has also begun to elucidate how designers structure knowledge to be able to 
most effectively translate existing knowledge to useful novelty (Linsey et al, 2008). Abstractions 
such as functional thinking (Wood et al, 2009) seem particularly well suited to serve as 
knowledge structures that are easy to use in analogical transfer. Continuing research on 
knowledge structures may be expected to eventually further unpack the concept of expertise but 
cognitive psychologists have confirmed that experience leads to greater use of abstractions and 
an ability to avoid unnecessary details in problem solving of various kinds (Reyna, 1996).  
 
2.3 Design in an economic context 
 
Hobday et al (2012) recently argued that a gap of understanding remains between design 
thinking and innovation policies, while promoting design for more effective innovation and 
national economic growth has become a key policy aim of many nations and governments, 
including the United Kingdom, Singapore and China. It is still unclear how design research can 
provide guidance to economic growth and policy making. Our purpose in briefly surveying 
aspects of the design research literature above is to connect the field of design (and design theory) 
more specifically to the field of innovation and economic growth. 
 
The most important issue that arises from considering design in the context of national economic 
growth is how to sustain and grow design expertise and the outcome of design practices. The 
prior design practices and experience that do not strongly relate to or enable future success tend 
not to be economically viable and sustainable. Compared to non-technical designs (e.g. aesthetic 
design, industrial design, etc.), technology-based designs can bring the advantages of 
“accumulation”, which sustains growth. Studies of the functional performances of technology-
based design output (among many examples are Moore, 2006; Martino, 1970; Nordhaus, 2007; 
Koh and Magee, 2006, 2008) have generally shown that performance increases exponentially 
over time at varying rates depending upon the domain studied. Because of the cumulative nature 
of technology progress, knowledge of recent advances in a given technology allow one to design 
things continually better and better—that is, sustainable growth. In turn, these performance 
increases are the result of continual design efforts over time. Technology-based design activities 
enable the designers’ capabilities to accumulate and be used to do the next things (cumulative 
again), thus gives them sustained advantages.  
 
In addition, following the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), if a design process 
and its outcome are difficult to imitate, competitive advantage from it may be sustained for a 
longer term. Thus, the designers are more likely to produce difficult-to-imitate products and 
services when the most advanced (and continually advancing) scientific knowledge and 
technologies are intensively used in the design process. 
 
Therefore, although Simon’s parsimonious definition on design does not include “technology-
based”, it is clear that having this element enter a broad definition of design is important in an 
economic sense. Many technology-based design processes focus on finding new mechanisms, 
embodiments, and forms to fulfill existing or slightly extended functions. Examples are the 
ongoing design of airplanes, automobiles, computers, data storage devices, medical devices, 
semiconductors and materials, and large engineering systems such as electrical grids, 
telecommunication networks, and transportation networks. Alternatively, design may focus on 
the question of what/why (“function, fitness or adaption”). Such designs can be built on existing 
technologies but focus on finding new functions, new applications, or new markets based upon 
the emerging technological possibilities. Examples might include designing Yahoo.com and 
Facebook.com both of which are built on the rapidly evolving Internet/world wide web 
infrastructure. In some important cases, new functions and mechanisms arrive together. These 
can be related to “translations” of new scientific and technological research (such as lasers) or 
new technical developments that support a (largely) new function (“car phones” in the 1970s). 
 
The focus on function is the core of design efforts oriented toward users, which adapts the 
functions of products or service to the users’ culture, taste, and habit, etc. Such designs based 
upon deep understanding of users can provide customers new reasons or meanings to buy the 
products, with well-fitted functions but little-changed technology and utility inside. Such a 
design orientation may lead to market successes, as shown in many examples (Utterback, 2006; 
Verganti, 2009). However, such design processes are not cumulative because success in one time 
or one place does not necessarily increase the likelihood of success later or at other places. In 
particular, adaptation to discovered user preferences can be made in designs that follow the 
technological improvement path and thus “user-oriented only designs” can be surpassed in 
relatively short times. Thus, design oriented toward fitting functions or interfaces to users may 
achieve temporary or regional successes but hardly contribute to overall phenomenal and long-
range GDP growth, like those from the successful design of the steam turbine (first industrial 
evolution), electricity (second industrial evolution), and computing technologies (information 
age). More importantly for our purposes, this kind of design activity is not likely to lead to long-
run sustainable design leadership in any domain. 
 
2.4 Key learning from design research literature  
 
In brief, the design research literature establishes the following insights. Basically, deep design 
expertise is the key enabler of usefully creative design, and can only result from continual 
knowledge- and capability-building efforts over time. Specifically, technology-based design 
efforts, as opposed to design more broadly defined, best enable the designers’ capabilities to 
accumulate and gives them sustained advantages. Because of the cumulative nature of 
technology progress, technology-based design is most valuable for sustaining economic growth. 
The sharper focus on technology-based design (and the need for continual efforts to accumulate 
design capability), will allow for a more actionable strategy for sustaining economic growth. 
Therefore, our analysis hereafter will focus on technology-based design and related capability-
building efforts to examine national attempts for knowledge-based and innovation-driven 
economic growth. 
 
 
3. Assessing design capability 
 
Now we turn to the capability to conduct the desired technology-based design activities outlined 
above. Design capability operates to create economically valuable novelty and is thus distinct 
from “research capability” that uses knowledge to create knowledge, and “productive capability” 
that accurately and economically replicates the results of design. Design capability defined in 
this way enables new, creative and better products, services and solutions to continually emerge, 
thus allows the firms, nations or regions that possess the design capability to sustain and grow in 
an evolving environment.  
 
From many aspects, design capability can be viewed as a specific kind of “dynamic capability”, 
which allows one to respond to the changing environment (Teece et al, 1997), or proactively 
create changes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and a rather actionable dynamic capability. 
However, it is important to view any of these dynamic capabilities—particularly design 
capability—in an evolutionary economics perspective (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Design 
capability is an accumulated learning capability that is built incrementally. As a capability, 
design capability in real-world situations is often a matter of degree, rather than dichotomous 
(Winter, 2000).  
 
Capabilities generally cannot easily be bought but must be built because their creation and 
evolution are embedded in organizational learning processes shaped by the past asset positions 
and evolutionary paths of the firms, nations or regions (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Therefore, 
design capabilities are naturally heterogeneous across the boundaries of organizations or nations. 
Heterogeneity is one issue that must be considered when assessing design capability in different 
countries. Assessing design capability is also not something that can be accomplished without a 
temporal viewpoint since it is clear we are examining an evolutionary path-dependent process. 
What one is trying to understand is how successfully the evolution is occurring. Heterogeneity 
occurs across time since there are numerous paths potentially available for evolution to world-
class design capability. 
 
Paths can include long gestation periods with protection (Japan and Korea for automotive 
design). Another path can apparently involve competition from the low end--design of 
smaller/cheaper variants and movement up the cost/complexity chain (Brazil for airplanes). A 
third path that has apparently also worked has involved moving to higher and higher 
manufacturing capability and then to design of manufacturing systems and eventually to design 
of the product (Taiwan for computers and smart phones). There is no guarantee that a path taken 
will end with sustainable design capability as many examples of non-success exist (for example, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and others in automotive design). Indeed, design capability in a domain can 
be lost over time if sufficient expertise is not nurtured to maintain competitiveness (for example, 
UK automotive). In this paper, we will be focusing on countries that are attempting to develop 
design capability and will not further consider loss of existing capability. 
 
In all of these and other paths that one can imagine, there are numerous related conditions and 
context that will either enable or disable the evolution towards design capability. A potentially 
important path with many important contextual conditions is one that starts with a new 
technological/scientific discovery and that pursues the formation of profitable companies such as 
the semiconductor sector in Silicon Valley. Some of the context in the Silicon Valley case is the 
existence of prior electronics startups (Sturgeon, 2000), unhindered employee moves between 
firms (including important new startups such as Fairchild, Intel and National Semiconductor), 
open, inexpensive legal help and others well documented (Saxenian, 1991, 1996; Klepper et al, 
2009; Klepper, 2010). Nonetheless, the evolution of a very strong design capability for 
Integrated Circuits was an essential part of the formation of Silicon Valley story.  
 
Despite the heterogeneity among design domains, the path dependence of any specific 
evolutionary case and the many important contextual factors, it is still useful to attempt to 
measure design capability based upon the fundamentals in section 2. Table 1 is an attempt to 
measure design capability, starting from “ideal” metrics not all of which are available. 
 
Table 1 
Possible metrics for assessing the evolution of a nation or region toward world-class design capability. 
Metric Rationale/Comments Possible Units 
1. Economic impact of successful 
designs 
Direct measure of end-point/ data 
not likely to be obtainable 
% of GDP (regional or national) 
derived from designs created 
2. Scale (total) of  companies 
achieving global-level designs 
Potentially close to direct measure/ 
difficult to obtain meaningful data 
% GDP due to companies doing 
globally-competitive design 
(export % may be meaningful as 
well) 
3. Employed engineers and 
scientists in technology-based 
design 
Should be related (over longer term) 
to a direct measure 
Fraction of workforce of 
engineers and scientists doing 
technological-based design. R & 
D spending as a fraction of GDP. 
4. Patents A  good measure of significant 
technology-based design output (for 
areas where patents are important) 
Number of United States patent 
grants 
5. Technologically significant 
publications 
Evidence for the fundamental 
knowledge base needed for world-
class design 
Number of engineering journal 
papers 
6. Employed engineers Necessary for technology-based 
design 
Fraction of graduate engineers in 
workforce 
7. Education of engineers Basis for future of technology-based 
design 
Fraction of graduated engineers in 
each cohort 
 
 
Items 1 and 2 in Table 1 are potentially the most direct measures but items 3-7 are indicative and 
generally are more available. In the case of item 1, the idea of such a metric is that one could 
measure the total economic impact of a design but doing so would mean that not only licensing 
fees but also all other economic impacts such as company profits, employment, wage differences, 
export success, etc. would have to be estimated. To do this with full reliability, it would be best 
to make such assessments in the nation/region with and without specific designs. The 
counterfactual situation is not knowable and thus this measure is conceptual and not realizable. 
We put it first on the list to inspire further analysis. Item 2 is a possible way to assess the impact 
and attempts to do so by looking at the economic impact of firms within a nation that have 
benefits beyond their own company in the sense of Michael Porter’s analyses of nations (Porter, 
1990). Unpacking design from other economic activities (such as manufacturing, service 
delivery and resource exploitation and utilization) would be necessary and to our knowledge has 
not been done. 
 
The number of engineers/scientists employed in technology-based designs (item 3) is a very 
good measure of our concept of design capability emphasizing deep design expertise. This is 
because, if such employment is long-term, it signals the ability to economically recover high 
costs of technology-based design. Actual engineering employment (item 6) is more general and 
not as good a measure but it is not easy to classify employment of engineers as design employees. 
Research, manufacturing, service delivery and other work is done by engineers in addition to 
design. However, a decent metric to estimate item 3 is total private R&D spending as this 
eliminates all work except that on basic research and design (as we are broadly defining it in this 
paper). Thus, we will use R&D spending (normalized by GDP) as one assessment of design 
capability in our analysis in section 5. A limitation of this metric is that it is not domain-specific 
as usually measured. However, we believe this is the best input metric to consider for now so we 
will use it below. 
 As an output of global world-class technology-based design, what we propose in item 4 is to 
assess the number of United States patents granted to the country of interest. Patent data has been 
extensively used to study national innovation capacity in the innovation literature (Furman, 
Porter and Stern, 2002; Huang, 2010). Even though this is also our best output metric, it has 
three important limitations: 1) some technically-based domains are not as oriented to patents as 
others and 2) the measures we have are generally not domain specific and 3) US patents only 
imperfectly reflect global technical leading designs. Our second best output metric is given in 
item 5. The number of technologically significant publications indicates that the proper kind of 
technical knowledge and expertise is building and thus it is also used in section 4. The last two 
metrics in Table 1, Employed Engineers (Item 6) and Education of Engineers (Item 7), have been 
used by others and may on occasion be worth reviewing but they added nothing to our analyses 
and so are not reported here. 
 
In addition to the metrics, the issue of the emergence of globally significant technologically-
based companies is quite relevant to assessing the emergence of national design capability. Thus, 
qualitative assessment of the emergence of such companies and qualitative evaluation of the 
patenting organizations are also undertaken in the empirical analysis in Section 4. These 
qualitative studies and use of metric 5 in Table 1 are the additions to standard “national 
innovation studies”, introduced by our technology-based design perspective. If this design-
centric perspective continues to be utilized, metrics related to items 1 and 2 in Table1 will bring 
even more supplements to the standard approaches. 
 
4. Assessing design capabilities of four countries 
 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Finland are chosen for the comparative assessment of 
design capability, because they are similar in that (1) they are relatively small; (2) their 
economies developed rapidly in the past three decades; (3) they are striving to develop 
knowledge-based economies.  
 
4.1 Economic development 
 All four countries have achieved phenomenal economic growth in the past few decades, but 
through different paths. Korea’s economy and growth has been historically dominated by 
Chaebols, i.e. the large family business groups such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, etc. The Korean 
government restlessly protected Chaebols from domestic and foreign competition during their 
early years, and allowed them to grow in size and capital strength rapidly, through contract 
manufacturing and imitated products for exports. Finland’s recent economic success largely 
relied on the success of Nokia. The momentum of Taiwan’s economy came from contract 
manufacturing of semiconductors, electronics components and computers for American fabless 
firms. The successful growth of Taiwan’s IT sector was related to the modularization trend of 
computers and electronics products since the 1980s, which drove component outsourcing and 
vertical disintegration in IT-related industries (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Strojwas, 2005). 
 
Singapore’s economic development results from successful large-scale logistics activities 
(“Entrepot plus”), from finance and from other services such as airlines and real estate. In 
addition, it was driven by multi-national corporations’ operations located in Singapore. This last 
item successfully happened due to the government’s massive investments in physical 
infrastructure and human capital (through education/training), and business-friendly policies and 
services (Lee, 2000). Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) played a central and 
successful role in attracting global multi-national corporations to operate in Singapore (Schein, 
1996; Lee, 2000). The multi-national corporations (MNCs) first brought in labor-intensive low-
cost manufacturing jobs in the 1970s and then capital-intensive and high-skill engineering 
activities in the 1980s. The successes to the present have already made Singapore the country 
with the highest GDP per capita in Asia in 2010 (well above Japan). Fig. 2 shows that Singapore 
has constantly achieved significantly higher GDP per Capita than the others in the comparison 
group since the early 1990s.  
 Fig. 2. Per Capita GDP based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) (Current International Dollars) 
Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
 
4.2 R&D expenditure 
 
Past economic successes have led (and allowed) all four countries to heavily and increasingly 
invest in R&D, shown in their continually growing R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(Fig. 3a). In contrast to its far-leading GDP per Capita, Singapore’s R&D expenditure intensity 
lags behind those of the other three comparators. Breakdown of R&D expenditure shows the 
private-public divide of R&D expenditure is quite similar across these countries, with 70~80% of 
total spent by the private sector in recent years (Fig. 3b). 
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 b) Private sector R&D expenditure as percentage of total R&D expenditure 
Fig. 3. R&D expenditure 
Source: Data is compiled from multiple sources, including OECD iLibrary, Finland Statistics Press Releases, 
A*STAR National Survey of R&D, World Bank Development Indicators, Taiwan National Statistics, and Battelle 
Global R&D Funding Forecast (2001). 
 
4.3 R&D output 
 
All four countries rank well in science and math education (Tan and P.T., 2005) and all have 
developed a technologically-relevant knowledge base. Singapore has achieved a significantly 
higher number of engineering journal articles per capita (Fig. 4a) than the other countries. In this 
metric, South Korea lags possibly raising an issue about the depth and flexibility of their 
technological base. Taiwan and Finland are quite comparable to one another and rank clearly 
between Singapore and South Korea. 
 
In practical inventive output, Fig. 5b shows a very different ranking when patents per capita 
instead of publications or GDP per capita are compared (Fig. 4b). In this aspect, Taiwan is most 
prolific with Korea and Finland in the mid-range and now Singapore the clear laggard. Taiwan’s 
strength in filing patents and mediocrity in publishing papers is distinctly different from the 
pattern of Singapore. These two countries have clearly demonstrated different abilities for 
turning demonstrated technological knowledge into commercially-oriented inventions, indicating 
different design capabilities. 
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b) U.S. patents per million people 
Fig.4. R&D output 
Sources: authors’ calculation based on publication data from Compendex (searching only journal articles), patent 
data from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and population data from IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database. 
 
A breakdown of patents by organization makes further distinctions among the group. The 
majority of “Singaporean patents” (i.e. the patents whose first-named inventor is a resident of 
Singapore) grants actually go to MNCs, public research agencies and universities (Fig. 5), while 
patents dominantly are produced by indigenous firms in each of the other countries. This 
distinction indicates MNCs’ major role in building up Singapore’s technology-based design 
capability. The patenting scenario in Singapore has changed over time—indigenous firms 
experienced a decline in early years but are now apparently equal to MNCs at ~40% each, 
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whereas the public sector has rather stably contributed about 20 percent of patent filing overtime.  
 
Fig.5. Percentages of patents from the top 20 organizations receiving the highest numbers of patent grants by 
organization type 
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from USPTO Statistics. 
 
Table 2 lists the top five patenting organizations in each country and globally: the four countries 
have demonstrated clearly different patterns of patenting. A cluster of firms actively patenting in 
the electronics-related domains has occurred in both Korea and Taiwan. Through continuous 
learning by doing, the Chaebols have become Korea’s leading technical inventors and among the 
best in the world. For instance, in 2010, Samsung received 4,259 patents (only IBM with 5,866 
patents received more) and LG received 1,450 patents (9th place in the world). Taiwan differs by 
having a far larger number of patenting firms and firms patenting in a small volume (see Table 3), 
than any of the other countries, and having ITRI (Industrial Technology Research Institute), a 
public R&D organization, receiving 464 U.S. patent grants in 2010—the second largest patenting 
organization in Taiwan. Finland’s patents primarily go to the single giant—Nokia, whose patents 
grants in 2010 are 554 (not including the numbers of Nokia-affiliated firms), which is 20 times 
more than the second place—Metro Paper, Inc. The patenting activity of Singapore-based 
organizations is at a magnitude about 1/50 of the organizations in Korea, or 1/7 of those in 
Taiwan. Based upon these patent results, design capability focusing on the broad but related 
electronics domain may have already been established in Korea and Taiwan, while Finland’s 
capability is de facto built in a single firm and there is little indication of strong design capability 
building up in Singapore. 
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Table 2  
Top five patenting organizations in four countries 
 
Rank Organization 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Singapore 1 Stats Chippac 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 20 30 85 
 
2 Agency for Science Technology 
and Research 0 0 1 3 14 26 38 27 31 44 
 
3 Marvell International 1 2 1 0 2 4 13 22 31 37 
 
4 Chartered Semiconductors 108 125 92 73 45 56 36 25 22 34 
 
5 Micro Technology 2 6 21 34 32 35 37 26 24 33 
S. Korea 1 Samsung Electronics Co. 1378 1274 1253 1514 1569 2306 2583 3325 3394 4259 
 
2 LG Electronics Inc. 245 335 404 474 461 683 665 774 1044 1450 
 
3 Hynix Semiconductors Inc. 4 96 244 331 353 438 400 435 584 972 
 
4 LG Display Co. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 268 590 715 
 
5 Electronics & Telecom Research Institute  
72 89 103 86 112 171 205 254 304 457 
Taiwan 1 Hon Hai Precision Ind. Co. 309 191 180 216 136 231 183 278 416 572 
 
2 Industrial Technology Research Institute 219 215 205 196 159 237 224 271 376 464 
 
3 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. 528 445 428 455 430 459 454 355 292 405 
 
4 Au Optronics Corp. 0 12 39 76 104 157 176 174 234 358 
 
5 Mediatek Inc. 3 1 5 22 29 104 121 151 146 223 
Finland 1 Nokia Corporation 6 24 154 256 222 403 470 420 449 554 
 
2 Metro Paper, Inc. 10 52 55 63 46 45 29 39 26 29 
 
3 ABB OY. 0 5 5 3 13 19 20 14 11 29 
 
4 Kone Corp. 11 9 10 3 10 9 14 26 33 25 
 
5 Outotec OYJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 13 21 
Global 1 IBM 3411 3288 3415 3248 2941 3621 3125 4169 4887 5866 
 
2 Samsung Electronics Co. 1446 1328 1313 1604 1641 2451 2723 3502 3592 4518 
 
3 Microsoft Corporation 396 499 499 629 746 1463 1638 2026 2901 3086 
 
4 Canon 1877 1892 1992 1806 1829 2368 1983 2107 2200 2551 
 
5 Panasonic Corporation * 1440 1544 1774 1934 1688 2229 1910 1724 1806 2456 
Source: USPTO Statistics data. In USPTO statistics, the list for all countries gives different numbers from those specific countries. We use the 
original data from USPTO so discrepancies appear for Samsung in the table here.  
* Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. changed its name to Panasonic Corporation in 2008. The numbers in this row are sums of numbers for 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. and Panasonic Corporation, both of which appeared in the USPTO database.  
 
Table 3 
Number of organizations with more than 5 U.S. patent grants between 2006 and 2010 
Number of Patents Singapore S. Korea Taiwan Finland 
From 5 to 10 36 97 294 48 
From 11 to 100 24 94 233 37 
From 101 to 1000 6 12 39 2 
From 1001 to 10000 0 6 4 1 
Above 10000 0 1 0 0 
Total 66 210 570 88 
                                      Source: authors’ calculation based on USPTO statistics data. 
 
4.4 Creation of Technology-based Companies 
 
In addition, these four countries have also shown very different patterns of creating technology-
based firms. In Korea, Chaebols are the main actors that invest in design and profit from design, 
and some of them have built strong design capability indicated by world-leading patenting 
records. The Finish government has a strategy to stimulate startups and turn lab/research results 
into commercial products, and particularly TEKES is charged to nurture technology startups in 
the form of venture capital. Many of the successful companies, such as Nokia, which grew on 
TEKES’s investment, later became institutional investors of TEKES. However, no other firms 
than Nokia has achieved globally-competitive design capability so far. For a small country of 
five million people, the success of a single firm may be sufficient to elevate the national 
economy, whereas the dependence on a single firm also casts doubt on a sustainable future. In 
Taiwan, building on their early success in contract manufacturing and electronic components, the 
Taiwanese firms have also gradually invested in design and intellectual property, and several 
previous contract manufacturers have been able to design sophisticated products. Moreover, 
Taiwan has seen a group of globally competitive design-centric companies in the computer and 
electronics sector, such as Acer, HTC, ASUS, and the world’s leading contract manufacturers, 
including Foxconn (Hon Hai’s subsidiary), TSMC and UMD. In particular, ITRI of Taiwan has 
spun off over 150 leading IT companies, including Acer and UMD.  
 
However, indigenous firms that are strong in product and service design, intellectual property 
and brands have not emerged in Singapore. Perhaps the closest Singapore comes to this 
achievement are OSIM, the healthy lifestyle and massage chair retailer, and Creative Technology, 
the consumer electronics and multimedia company. Neither of these Singaporean companies are 
yet global household names. Singapore’s shortfall in this area is often attributed to its small size 
as a city state and thus not a place where firms can generate significant revenue and user base at 
a world class. This is an uncertain argument because Samsung, LG and Hyundai, Nokia, Acer, 
ASUS and HTC, all originated in countries with relatively small domestic markets. As a matter 
of fact, a common attribute of these firms is that they have produced and then designed for the 
global markets since their beginning. World-class design-centric firms, which originate from 
small countries, must design their products and services for customers in global markets. 
 
4.5 Indications from a design perspective 
 The metrics have demonstrated usefulness (with limitations) in revealing similarities and 
disparities in design capability across nations in an economic context. Similarly all four countries 
have achieved growing patterns in all quantitative indicators. Meanwhile, disparity exists across 
indicators and sheds light on different design capabilities being built. For instance, Taiwan’s 
strength in patenting and mediocrity in publishing papers is distinctly different from these 
measures for Singapore. This contrast indicates Taiwan has built stronger design capability (i.e. 
turning demonstrated knowledge into inventions) than Singapore so far, at least in some 
technological domains. Furthermore, the results have also demonstrated these countries’ different 
trajectories of design capability building. For instance, according to the distribution of patents 
across organizations, national design capability might have been primarily built by a few large 
firms supported by the government in Korea, a single large firm in Finland, wide-spread large 
and small firms in Taiwan, whereas the patent results indicate little design capability being built 
in Singapore. 
 
Overall, this macro-level assessment may indicate that each of these countries is on a 
significantly differing path for its evolution of design capability, so one cannot simply compare 
them on a single capability dimension. Each of these small countries can also be viewed as a 
success model in that they have been economically advancing rapidly for three decades. 
However, none of them is without concerns about their future progress to a sustainable 
knowledge economy. Based on a design-focused perspective, the foregoing quantitative 
comparison implies a few potential risks:  
1) Taiwan’s relatively low R&D spending may indicate a weakness in having sufficient design 
people to pursue new fields as old ones begin to be over-competitive; 
2) South Korea’s low publication rate may indicate a weakness in having sufficient depth to 
educate leading technical design experts of the future;  
3) Finland has the weakness of depending upon a single firm to develop the design capacity of 
the nation, thus any accidental business challenge in the sector or the firm may lead to 
dissipation of any cumulative capability. 
4) Singapore is the weakest in R&D expenditure, patenting rate, and formation of technology-
based companies in the group, possibly indicating little design capability being built. There 
are several interpretations for this result discussed below. 
 
One possible interpretation of Singapore’s pattern is that its strong economic performance 
indicates super efficiency in the model it has relied on to develop the economy in the past 
decades. It is also possible to interpret the results as casting doubt on the sustainability of 
Singapore’s long-run economic growth. As a matter of fact, in an early study of Singapore’s 
competitiveness, Michael Porter (2002) has attributed Singapore’s outstanding economic 
achievement to taking the investment-driven strategy (Porter, 1990) of economic development to 
an extraordinary level. He also speculated that the limits of the investment-driven strategy will 
become apparent as wages increase, labor force reaches upper limits, and countries (like China) 
in the same region increasingly compete using the same strategy. Porter further suggested 
Singapore should develop an innovation-driven economy, in order to sustain its economic 
growth in the long run. However, without making use of the lens of design process and design 
capability, his advice was largely narrative at the level of innovation and did not lead to a 
focused action plan.  
Interesting enough, recently Singapore has explicitly emphasized “design” as the key component 
in the government’s national strategy for next-stage economic growth, and, to our best 
knowledge, is the only country which has done so. This may result from the government’s 
awareness of the important link between design and innovation-driven economic development, 
and its weak design capability as indicated by the metrics just reviewed. All these make 
Singapore an interesting case worthy of further investigation. So now we turn to qualitatively 
assess Singapore’s national strategy at a more detailed micro level. 
 
5 Qualitative assessment of Singapore’s design strategy 
 
5.1 Data collection 
 
Our analysis of Singapore’s design strategy is based on government documents and fieldwork 
(on-site interviews). We first surveyed and reviewed various recent and historical official 
government reports, in order to build an understanding of the evolution and current landscape of 
design-related strategies, initiatives, actors and activities in Singapore. Table 4 lists the most 
useful reports we reviewed. The Economic Strategies Committee reports are an important source 
to understand the historical and recent economic strategies of the government, and how design 
has emerged as an emphasis in such strategies. 
 
Table 4 
Reviewed Governmental Reports 
Title Author Year Summary 
The Singapore Economy: New 
Directions (Executive Summary)  
 
Economic 
Committee 
1986  
 
The first report of its kind, the 1986 Economic Committee 
report was written in response to Singapore’s 1985-86 
recession, which occurred after a number of decades of 
strong economic growth. The report presents the following 
new strategies for promoting growth:  
1) Resource Allocation  
2) Maintain a High Savings Rate  
3) Create a Conducive Business Environment  
4) Depend on the Private Sector  
5) Promote Offshore Activities  
6) Nurture both MNCs and Local Companies  
Thirty Years of Economic 
Development  
 
Economic 
Development 
Board 
1991 This report summarizes and celebrates the strategies and 
accomplishments of the Economic Development Board on 
its 30 year anniversary.  
Founded in 1961, the initial focus of the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) was job creation, given the 
14% unemployment rate in 1961. At least partially 
through efforts of the EDB, unemployment was no longer 
a problem by the late 1970s. Singapore evolved its 
economic strategy from low-cost labor to higher-skilled 
labor, to higher value-added industries and services, 
including research and development, starting in the 1970s. 
The 1980s are seen by the EDB as Singapore’s “Second 
Industrial Revolution” when Singapore moved into a 
modern industrial economy based on science, technology, 
skills and knowledge. In 1986, the small business bureau 
was set up as part of the EDB.  
The Strategic Economic Plan: 
Towards a Developed Nation 
(Executive Summary)  
Ministry of Trade 
and Industry  
1991  
 
In order to maintain and extend Singapore’s international 
competitiveness, and propel Singapore's economic and 
social progress to that of a developed country, the 
following strategies are recommended:  
1) Promoting National Teamwork  
2) Becoming Internationally Oriented  
3) Creating a Conducive Climate for Innovation  
4) Developing Manufacturing and Service Clusters  
5) Spearheading Economic Redevelopment  
6) Maintaining International Competitiveness  
7) Reducing Vulnerability  
Strategic pragmatism: the culture of 
Singapore's Economic Development 
Board  
Edgar H. Schein 1996  Schein’s book reflects on the culture of the Economic 
Development Board, and its role in Singapore’s rapid 
development.  
The author conducted a series of interviews in the early 
1990s with current and former employees of the EDB, as 
well as with individuals from industry who had interacted 
with the agency, and moved operations to Singapore. The 
author highlights a number of specific cases of companies 
investing in Singapore, from both the company and EDB’s 
point of view.  
The author is able to identify a number of cultural 
elements that link to the success of the EDB in its 
economic goals, but also brings to light less discussed 
areas of improvement and criticisms of the EDB.  
Report on Singapore’s 
Competitiveness (Executive 
Summary)  
 
Committee on 
Singapore’s 
Competitiveness 
(source) 
1998  
 
In response to the regional economic crisis at that time, 
and to achieve sustained growth, the report recommends 
the following:  
1) reduce business costs, to help viable companies tide 
over the crisis and minimize unemployment.  
2) ensure that the framework for economic activity 
continues to function effectively.  
3) maintain investor confidence. 
4) step up capability-building and economic restructuring  
5) further expand trade with growth markets in the 
developed countries and seek out new markets beyond the 
region. 
6) leverage on market opportunities in regional economies 
to form strategic partnerships. 
New Challenges, Fresh Goals – 
Towards a Dynamic Global City 
(Report of the Economic Review 
Committee)  
 
Economic Review 
Committee  
 
2003  
 
There are three recommendations from the 2003 ERC 
report:  
Singapore should aim to be: 
1) a globalised economy where Singapore is the key node 
in the global network, linked to all the major economies;  
2) a creative and entrepreneurial nation willing to take 
risks to create fresh businesses and blaze new paths to 
success; and  
3) a diversified economy powered by the twin engines of 
manufacturing and services, where vibrant Singapore 
companies complement MNCs, and new startups coexist 
with traditional businesses exploiting new and innovative 
ideas.  
Report of the Committee on the 
Expansion of the University Sector  
Higher Education 
Division, Ministry 
of Education  
2008  A detailed plan for the expansion of the university sector 
from accommodating 25% of Singapore’s cohort to 30% is 
set-out. The key strategy in this plan is the establishment 
of a new university, addressing the need for a new type of 
graduate as Singapore moves into knowledge-based, high 
value-added activities such as research and development.  
Dgs II: Strategic Blueprint of the 
Design Singapore Initiative  
Design Singapore 
Council 
2008 A thorough assessment of the creative design industry in 
Singapore. The Design Singapore Council created this 
report in 2008. The report presents measures on the 
execution of DSG I (2004-2009), the inaugural phase of 
the Design Singapore program. It also states the goals and 
performance indicators of DSG II (2009-2015). Finally it 
presents Design Singapore’s vision for Singapore 2020.  
High-Skilled People, Innovative 
Economy, Distinctive Global City 
(Economic Strategies Committee 
Key Recommendations)  
 
Economic 
Strategies 
Committee 
2010 
 
Most recently an Economic Strategies Committee 
convened in 2009. The 2010 report recommended the 
following seven key strategies:  
1) Growing Through Skills and Innovation  
2) Anchor Singapore as a Global-Asia Hub  
3) Build a Vibrant and Diverse Corporate Ecosystem  
4) Make Innovation Pervasive, and Strengthen 
Commercialization of R&D  
5) Become a Smart Energy Economy  
6) Enhance Land Productivity to Secure Future Growth  
7) Build a Distinctive Global City and an Endearing Home  
Strategies 1, 3, and 4 are particularly relevant to a 
discussion of design; however there are threads of the 
strategy throughout the entire report.  
 As a second step, we conducted on-site interviews at a number of organizations that participate 
in design-related initiatives, to learn about their design-related activities and incentives in spring 
2011. The selected organizations are listed in Table 5 according to different organization types, 
including government agencies (GAs), small-medium enterprises (SMEs) and multi-national 
corporations (MNCs). The job positions of interviewees at these organizations range from design 
director to chief technology officer to regional sales manager.  
 
Table 5 
Interviewed Organizations and Agencies and Interview Questions 
Organization  Types Organizations Main Questions 
Government Agency 
(GA) 
1. Economic Development Board 
2. SPRING 
3. Design Singapore 
4. Ministry of Education/DTES 
5. SMART 
- Key performance indicators;  
- Programs and incentives administered;  
- The history of the agency’s responsibility; 
- What about Singapore makes it effective  
  for companies to do design work here. 
Multi-National 
Corporation (MNC) 
6. EADS 
7. Dell 
8. Philips Design 
9. Hewlett-Packard 
10. Electrolux 
- Design activities performed in Singapore; 
- Any interactions and incentives from   
  Singapore agencies; 
- How the Singapore operations fit into the  
  company’s global operations. 
Small-Medium 
Enterprise (SME) 
11. OSIM 
12. Fong’s Engineering 
13. Lawton & Yeo 
14. SYSTMZ 
15. Design Exchange 
16. XentiQ 
- Design activities performed in Singapore; 
- Any interactions and incentives from  
  Singapore agencies. 
 
Two sets of formalized interview questions were developed for different types of organizations. 
For government agencies, we asked about key performance indicators; programs and incentives 
administered; the history of the agency’s responsibility; and what about Singapore makes it 
effective for companies to do design work there. For companies, we asked about the design 
activities performed in Singapore; any interactions and incentives from government agencies; for 
multi-national corporations (MNCs), how the Singapore operations fit into the company’s global 
operations. In all cases, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, and thus 
responses were not limited to a strict interpretation of the questions, and elaboration and 
interviewee-instigated discussion was encouraged. 
 
5.2 Design in national strategy 
 Faced with increased workforce wage and living standards and growing competition from 
neighboring countries for contract manufacturing that were discussed in section 4.5, the 
Singaporean government has been shifting the emphasis in national strategy from a 
manufacturing-based economy towards a knowledge-based one since the 1980s. Since then, 
there have been more engineering and value-added jobs created in Singapore. In particular, 
design has gradually emerged as an emphasis in Singapore’s recent national strategy to sustain 
future economic growth, as evidenced in a number of government documents. This strategic shift 
towards design and innovation first appears in the late-1970s, when the Product Development 
Assistance Scheme (PDAS) was introduced by EDB in “Thirty Years of Economic Development 
(1991):  
“PDAS awards cash grants to local companies developing new products or improving existing 
products or processes. It was set up to encourage local product development capability and to 
build up indigenous technology”. 
 
In the 1986 Economic Strategies Committee report, the following is recommended:  
“As an industrial centre, we must move beyond being a production base, to being an 
international total business centre. We cannot depend only on companies coming to 
Singapore solely to make or assemble products designed elsewhere. We need to attract 
companies to Singapore to establish operational headquarters, which are responsible for 
subsidiaries throughout the region. In Singapore such headquarters should do product 
development work, manage their treasury activities, and provide administrative, 
technical and management services to their subsidiaries”.  
 
In the 2010 Economic Strategies Committee report, design has been stated in its vision for 
Singapore’s future (pp. 15) which first elevates technology-based design to an important position,  
“We will have a vibrant climate of innovation, with both new and established businesses 
seeking commercial success through design, new products and services, and tapping on 
knowledge from a broader base of public and private sector R&D.”  
On the other hand, broader conceptualization of design is indicated in a section about 
emphasizing design-driven innovation (pp.29),   
“Instill design thinking in our workforce by accelerating the introduction of design 
thinking programmes and modules at local educational institutions and leading foreign 
design institutions. This can also be supported by incentives to help local enterprises 
grow their capabilities in areas such as product and industrial design.” 
 
5.3 Government programs and initiatives 
 
The Singaporean government has implemented a wide range of programs, grants, tax incentives 
and financing opportunities for the promotion of design activities, through various agencies and 
almost all channels of the government. Table 6 categorizes some of them collected from our 
interviews and literature surveys. Most of these support design capability broadly but increasing 
R&D intensity as well as translation of R&D to the economy is now also receiving attention 
from the National Research Foundation (NRF) and other Singaporean entities (see section 5.5). 
 
Table 6  
Singapore government’s design incentives (as of Spring 2011) 
Creative  
 
Grants and Programs 
 
Design Capability Development Programme  
Industry Association Development Scheme  
Design for Business Innovation  
Overseas Promotion Partnership Programme  
BrandPact  
Design for Internationalisation Programme 
Tax Incentives Productivity and Innovation Credit for Investments in Design  
Research & 
Development  
Grants and Programs 
 
Innovation Voucher Scheme 
Innovation Development Scheme  
Research Incentive Scheme for Companies  
Technology Innovation Programme - Experts  
Technology Innovation Programme - Projects  
Intellectual Property Management  
Environment Technology Research Programme  
Technology for Enterprise Capability Upgrading Initiative  
Technology Innovation Programme - Centres of Innovation  
Technology Pioneer Scheme  
Initiatives in New Technology  
Operation & Technology Roadmapping 
Design for Efficiency Scheme 
Innovation for Environmental Sustainability Fund 
Singapore Israel Industrial Research and Development 
Foundation 
IP for Internationalisation Programme 
Tax Incentives International Headquarters Award  
Regional Headquarters Award  
Development & Expansion Incentive  
Investment Allowance  
Liberalised Research and Development Tax Deductions  
Productivity and Innovation Credit  
R&D Tax Allowance Scheme  
Entrepreneurship  
 
Grants/Programs/Financing 
 
Incubator Development Program  
Technology Enterprise Commercialisation Scheme  
iStart  
Business Angel Funds  
Early-Stage Venture Funding Scheme  
SPRING Startup Enterprise Development Scheme  
Infocomm Business & Engineering Start-up Program  
Innovation Grant  
Explorer Grant  
Tax Incentives R&D Incentive for Start-up Enterprises Scheme  
Tax Exemption for Start-ups  
Angel Investors Tax Deduction Scheme  
 
The government has paid particular attention to the indigenous SMEs in order to incentivize 
them to adopt design in their business strategy. SME-oriented incentives are generally 
spearheaded by SPRING (Standards, Productivity & Innovation Singapore), with collaboration 
of International Enterprises Singapore and the Design Singapore Council. SPRING was founded 
in 1996 (as a merger of the National Productivity Board and the Singapore Institute of Standards 
and Industrial Research), to focus on developing and supporting Singapore’s SMEs. It is also the 
national standards and accreditation body. SPRING’s Chairman, Philip Yeo, is a noteworthy 
appointment when one considers his previous positions as head of the EDB (1986 to 2001) and 
A*STAR (1999 to 2007). International Enterprises (IE) Singapore is known formerly as the 
Singapore Trade Development Board. IE Singapore is an agency under the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, spearheading Singapore’s efforts to develop its external economic wing. Design 
Singapore Council was established in 2004 under the Ministry of Information, Communications 
and the Arts in response to the 2003 Economic Review Committee identification of Creative 
Industries as new economic growth sector. Design Singapore’s official mission is “to develop 
Singapore as a global city for design creativity”.  
 
A few examples of the incentives and programs tailored for SMEs are given in the next three 
sub-sections.  
 
- Innovation Voucher Scheme 
The Innovation Voucher Scheme is a tax incentive that SPRING offers. SMEs with innovative 
ideas can receive the vouchers and redeem them at the participating Knowledge Institutions 
(KIs), such as Nanyang Technology University, Ngee Ann Polytechnic, Singapore Polytechnic 
and the Singapore Institute of Manufacturing Technology. The aim is to encourage collaboration 
between SMEs and KIs in making innovative ideas work in practice. 
 
- Design for Enterprises 
The Design for Enterprises program, launched in 2008, is charged with encouraging SMEs to 
adopt “design” and help them develop the relevant capabilities. The program recruits and assigns 
experienced design facilitators, such as Philips Design, to provide help and supervision for 
indigenous SMEs that participate in the program. 50-70% of the fees for a design facilitator are 
subsidized by the government through the program. The program offers three levels of service, 
including Design Touch, Design Engage, and Design Excel, tailored for SMEs with different 
levels of established design capability and varied needs. The program will provide funding for up 
to 50% of certain costs incurred in the participation.  
 
- National Design Centre  
A key initiative of the Design Singapore Council is the establishment of a National Design 
Centre. The centre will house a Design Thinking and Innovation Academy where design thinking 
programs will be run for Singapore’s small-business community. 
 
5.4 Industry adoption of design 
 
- Multi-National Corporations (MNC) 
MNCs’ Singapore-based design activities were quite consistent across the firms we interviewed. 
First of all, it is observed that a number of world-class MNCs have been conducting “look-and-
feel” design activities for consumer products in Singapore. Second, some MNCs have relocated 
engineering and product development teams to Singapore. For example, Dell develops 
peripherals but not computers or servers in Singapore. Philips has its consumer lifestyle products 
team in Singapore. Third, some firms have located advanced engineering development work to 
Singapore: for example, EADS has a small wearable computing development team in Singapore. 
Hewlett-Packard has a small HP Labs group located in Singapore, focusing on cloud computing. 
In general, Singapore’s policies and institutional environment have successfully attracted MNCs 
to increase their design activities in Singapore. Such activities of MNCs may directly contribute 
to Singapore’s design capability and also potentially generate indirect spillover effects through 
formal and informal linkages to indigenous firms (Guimon, 2011). 
 
- Indigenous Small-Medium Enterprises (SME) 
Traditionally, most of the local SMEs provide contract manufacturing or engineering services to 
MNCs. However, throughout our interviews with SMEs, we heard a common sentiment of 
“moving up the value-chain”--for instance, a contract manufacturer becomes a contract designer 
and eventually designs products under its own brand. Despite these ambitions, there is no clear 
evidence that such an industry shift is underway. Although SMEs are commonly interested in the 
financial incentives that the government offers, and have in fact actively pursued a collection of 
generous incentives, such as subsidies and grants for design-related activities, our interviews 
indicate that, the government incentives they received have at best only marginally spurred 
design activities, and the building of a design culture and design capability. An impediment we 
learned from the interviewees at the firms we visited is the lack of design expertise, despite 
strong motivation in place. 
 
- Indigenous Large State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
 
Singapore has nurtured a few world-class state-owned companies in the service and logistics 
sectors. As a matter of fact, such large SOEs as Singapore Airline and Port of Singapore have 
been able to proficiently design large-scale service systems, making use of the most advanced 
technologies. Apparently, they have accumulated a lot of expertise and are also capital-rich. Thus 
the service and logistics sectors in Singapore may be on the way to an evolving globally-
competitive design cluster within Singapore. However, patent data may miss this because of low 
propensity to patent in such fields, and we performed no interviews in these sectors.  
 
- Other Players 
Singapore also has a few local design consulting firms, such as Lawton & Yeo and Design 
Exchange. These firms are normally small. For instance, Lawton & Yeo has about 30 employees 
and Design Exchange has only 12, in 2011. And, their businesses are primarily look-and-feel 
rather than technology-based design. In addition, a number of non-profit grassroots design 
organizations, including Design and Technology Educators Society (DTES), the Little Thoughts 
Group, FARM, and The Design Society have emerged in Singapore in recent years. There gather 
designers from industry pursuing passion projects that are not directly related to their 
professional work. This community may potentially have an impact on the forming of designer 
social networks and thus design clusters, but only if the concentration of expertise domains are 
taken seriously. 
 
5.5 Research and education for design 
 
The analysis in 4.1 has indicated that Singapore needs to improve its ability to turn research 
results into practically inventive output, on its already-strong education and research system. As 
a matter of fact, the government has started to make major investments in design-related 
education and research. The National Research Foundation (NRF), which was set up by the 
Prime Minister’s Office in 2006 to coordinate different research organizations, manages and 
allocates a fund of S$5 billion to support research and innovation programs. 
 
- Universities 
In May 2009, NRF granted S$22 million to three local universities—Nanyang Technological 
University (NTU) S$6.5 million; National University of Singapore (NUS) S$9 million; and 
Singapore Management University (SMU) S$6.5 million—to develop programs to make 
innovation and entrepreneurship pervasive in the country. NUS has established a design-centric 
engineering curriculum in academic year 2009~10, offering to cross disciplines, foster creativity 
and develop strong design skills. Although these initiatives may not focus on technology-based 
design one large Singapore program does. A new national university, Singapore University of 
Technology and Design (SUTD), is being established with a focused mission to systematically 
combine research intensity and design pedagogy. SUTD aims to educate students with not only 
basic knowledge, but also hands-on design experience and skills. The International Design 
Center has already been established as the close collaboration of SUTD with MIT to focus on 
research and education on technologically-intensive designs of new products, systems, and 
services. The center will also support and conduct research on design process, with a focus on 
methods and conditions to promote creative technical work. 
 
- Public R&D organizations 
In addition to the university-based initiatives, NRF and A*STAR have substantial design 
projects funded. In Singapore, A*STAR is the second largest patenting organization, with 44 U.S. 
patents granted in 2010 from zero in 2002. Both the NRF Research Centers for Excellence and 
A*STAR research units have newly established mechanisms for the transition of their research to 
commercial implementation. A*STAR uses its commercial arm—Exploit Technologies Pte Ltd 
(ETPL)—to market the intellectual properties created in A*STAR-funded research projects. For 
instance, A*STAR licensed patents for a magnetic tagging technology to combat counterfeiting 
in products to a small firm called Singular ID. Singular ID was in fact founded by two former 
scientists at the Institute of Material Research and Engineering of A*STAR. Singular ID was 
bought by an Indian firm for S$19.58 million in 2007. Despite small successes like Singular, in 
fact Singapore has thus far seen only a small number of new companies spun off from research 
labs and universities, and no research spin-off has grown into world-class and global household 
names, such as Hewlett & Packard and Google from Stanford University, Acer and UMD from 
ITRI—the A*STAR counterpart for Taiwan, or even the new but fast-growing A123 from MIT. 
Such initiatives as SMART Innovation Center and the POC (proof of concepts) grants by NRF 
could change this situation in the longer term but these are too new to assess.  
 
- Incubators 
The SMART Innovation Center was established in 2009, with the inspiration from MIT’s 
Deshpande Centre for Technological Innovation. SMART aims to identify emerging 
technologies and nurture technology-based startups. It operates under the Singapore-MIT 
Alliance for Research and Technology (SMART) and is funded by the National Research 
Foundation (NRF). Its programs and grants are available to all of Singapore’s research 
Institutions, both universities and polytechnics. 
 
5.6 A summary of the qualitative assessment of Singapore’s design strategy 
 
Singapore has a large and varied program to pursue design capability. Indeed, a first conclusion 
is that it has the broadest ranging and highly interlocking top-down strategy of any of the four 
countries we have studied and to our knowledge than anyone else globally. From the lens of 
technology-based design, some elements seem to be working well. These include: 
1) Educational system—strong science and technological focus; 
2) A new university (i.e. SUTD) focused on technology-based design and innovation; 
3) Advanced research and technological development—strong publications of papers of 
importance and sophistication; 
4) MNCs increasing technology-based design activities in Singapore; 
5) New push for technology-based startup companies. 
However, some other current activities in Singapore seem inappropriate based upon our 
analytical lens—technology-based design, including,   
1) An apparent emphasis on “look and feel” design and industrial design rather than 
technology-based design; 
2) Lack of emphasis on developing technologically-based expertise at SMEs. 
 
Despite the lack of basic design expertise of indigenous SMEs, SOEs in the service and logistics 
sector have accumulated a lot of expertise in designing large-scale service systems and MNCs 
are also increasing their design activities at their subsidiaries in Singapore. Singapore’s overall 
design capability building may accelerate if it can find ways to leverage the existing capabilities 
in the service and logistics sector to other technological sectors and to foster spillover effects 
from SOEs and MNCs to indigenous SMEs (for instance, through collaboration, employee 
mobility and spinoffs). 
 
In general, we believe that the longer-term aspects of Singapore’s strategy are well-aligned with 
the argument of this paper on the economic importance of technology-based design, even though 
gaps remain in the current activities. The key adjustment suggested by this assessment is to focus 
investments and efforts more on technology-based design rather than non-technical design, and 
more on building relevant capabilities incrementally of indigenous firms—possibly by 
leveraging the relatively stronger design capabilities of the SOEs and MNCs. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The literature on developing a knowledge-based economy has primarily focused on innovation as 
the analytical lens, whereas design is a valuable additional focus because it helps identify actions 
when one thinks about fostering innovation as an outcome of successful design. However, prior 
design research has offered few insights and guidance for innovation policies and national 
economic growth strategies. The limitation is largely due to the lack of focus (design is often 
viewed too broadly to guide specific actions) and the lack of research analyzing design in an 
economic context.  
 
To fill this gap between design research and economic policy, we analyzed the design research 
literature in an economic context. This analysis first identified that the cumulative nature of 
technology-based design has important strategic value for sustaining long-term economic 
growth. Economic growth will be sustained when a country’s future success can accumulatively 
build on its prior achievements and expertise. Only technology-based design, as opposed to the 
non-technical designs (e.g. aesthetic design, industrial design, etc.), directly bring the advantages 
of “accumulation”. This finding is sufficient to allow us to argue that, countries (such as 
Singapore, China) striving to sustain knowledge-based economic growth should focus their 
innovation policies on technology-based design and building national capabilities for such design. 
Our argument–grounded on design research–is quite significant both in a scholarly and in a 
policy sense.  
 
Making use of the lens of technology-based design, we assess and compare the design 
capabilities in four similar countries. Overall, our macro-level quantitative analysis indicates that 
each of these countries is on a significantly different path for its evolution of design capability 
and that, none of these countries is without concerns about their progress to a sustainable 
knowledge economy. More detailed examination of Singapore found that, while Singapore has 
the most comprehensive top-down strategy for pursuing design that we are aware of globally, the 
current activities (programs and incentives) seem to have over-emphasized non-technical designs 
(e.g. look-and-feel and industrial designs) relative to technology-based designs. These 
conclusions agree with the Singaporean government’s use of design as a strategic lever to pursue 
knowledge-driven economic growth, but also reveal shortfalls which indicates possible 
directions for strategic adjustment––some of which may well be underway as discussed in 
section 5.5. 
 
From an academic viewpoint, improvement of the assessment of design capability would be a 
viable way to proceed further. The metrics used in the present assessment do not differentiate 
themselves much from those used to examine national innovation capacity, although the 
technologically-significant publication rate and decomposition of patent sources have—to our 
knowledge— not been utilized previously. This may be partially due to the good availability of 
data on design outcomes (some of which become invention and innovation), and the lack of data 
on the macro characteristics of the processes of design. Thus, continued development of useful 
data sources in general is also seen as important even at this stage. Not to mention the data on the 
characteristics of design process, the examination of R&D spending can also be improved if data 
is available for further breakdowns by industries or some other characteristic with technical 
specificity. However, the data sources as of now do not support such decompositions.  
 
The difference in patenting and publication patterns may be due to difference in types of design 
capability or in technological domains. For example, large-scale technical systems design may 
not involve patenting as much as material or product design. Publications may also be of more 
importance in some technologically-based design, such as materials and software, than in others 
like electro-mechanical design. Thus, a valuable further examination might be to compare 
publications by disciplines, and patents by technological domains. 
 
Another valuable arena for further research would be to explore the mechanisms potentially 
important for the emergence and growth of national design capability. For instance, potential 
hypotheses can be related to the nurturing of design clusters and design ecosystem. Better 
understanding in this regard would guide the strategic endeavors of governments and firms in 
building design capabilities.  
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